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COMMENTS
DIRECTOR LIABILITY UNDER THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:

FACT OR FICTION?
by Michele Healy Ubelaker

NDER the business judgment rule a corporate director who acts
in good faith and without corrupt motive will not be held liable
for mistakes of business judgment that damage corporate interests.' The rule represents, in part, a judicial reluctance to interfere with
the internal affairs of a corporation. In Evans v. Armour & Co. 2 a federal
district court articulated the rationale of the business judgment rule:
[W]hen the law has occasion to inquire into [directors' activities] it is
not to substitute its judgment as to whether one offer is better than
another, or to resolve disagreements as to how the future business pattern of the corporation should proceed, but rather to determine if the
directors have acted soundly and in accord with accepted business
3
practices.
While this justification of the business judgment rule indicates that a
director must act in the best interest of his corporation, the failure to define
the parameters of the business judgment defense precisely substantially
stifles any attempt to quantify the degree of care that a director owes to his
corporation. The failure to confront issues of negligence and due care may
reflect the considerable confusion that exists as to which functions directors, particularly outside directors, must fulfill in managing corporate affairs.4 The lack of clarity that typifies the judicial treatment of a director's
legal accountability to a corporation and its shareholders mirrors the un1. The concept embodied in the rule, in the words of one commentator, has been a
"recurring theme that began early and has stayed late." Dyson, The Director's Liabilityfor
Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 367 (1965). See Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857). See also Lewis, The BusinessJudgment Rule And Corporate Directors'Liability For Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157
(1970); Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide ForJudicial
Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1967); Comment, The Business Judgment Rule." A
Guide To CorporateDirectors'Liability,7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 151 (1962). Although the obligations and potential liabilities of executive officers are quite often identical to those of directors, this Comment addresses only the legal relationship of directors to their corporation.
2. 241 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
3. Id at 712.
4. See notes 16-28 infra and accompanying text.
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certainty regarding the legal responsibility of corporate directors. Consequently, directors act with few real guidelines to influence their office, and
corporate representatives and shareholders face an uncertain result when
they seek judicial redress for damages to corporate interests under allegations of negligent mismanagement. Occasional decisions based on federal
securities law, however, suggest that directors may be held to a more
clearly defined standard of conduct in their function as corporate managers. 5 This Comment assesses the role that the business judgment rule has
played in shielding directors from legal accountability for their actions in
office and suggests that the developments under federal securities law may
force a resolution of the dilemma that faces shareholders and directors
alike. While this Comment includes frequent references to Texas law as a
point of reference, the laws of other jurisdictions also are examined. First,
this Comment examines the divergence between the legal and working
models of the corporate power structure. Secondly, this Comment sets
forth the common law and statutory duties of directors. Thirdly, the standard of conduct applicable to director conduct is explored. Fourthly, this
Comment evaluates the role the business judgment rule has played in
modifying this standard of conduct. Finally, the possible influence of federal securities law on director conduct is examined.
I.

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The Texas Business Corporation Act provides that "[tlhe business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors. ' ' 6 The
provision is typical of the delegation of corporate managerial function
under state codes 7 and is one aspect of power distribution in both public
and private corporations. The corporate power structure is viewed as a
pyramid, 8 with shareholders forming the large base, the board of directors
occupying a second stratum, and executive officers forming the apex.
5. See, e.g., Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479

F.2d 1277, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Escott v.

BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
6. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.31 (Vernon 1980).
7. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-301 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.33 (SmithHurd Supp. 1980-1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.13 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 301.28(1) (West 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1401 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-801 (1979). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59A (Page 1978) ("all

of the authority of a corporation shall be exercised by its directors"). Some states provide
that the management function shall rest in the board unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, in the bylaws, or by shareholder agreement. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-5-101 (Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-701(a) (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6301
(1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 25 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-

24(a) (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West Supp. 1981-1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
23A.08.340 (1969). Other states provide that management of corporate affairs shall be by or
under the direction of a board of directors. See note 29 infra. When citing to state codes,
the Texas Act will be cited exclusively if it typifies other corporation codes.
8. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, DirectorsandAccountants, 63 CAL. L. REv. 375, 376 (1975).
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Shareholders elect the board of directors 9 and vote on the disposition of
major corporate actions.10 The board has authority by law to appoint"
and remove 12 officers and to direct the affairs of the enterprise.' 3 Lastly,
executives, while vested with some discretion concerning the conduct of
their offices, in theory execute the policy defined by the board.' 4 Under
this legal scheme the practical power to control corporate affairs stems primarily from the directorial level. The shareholders give general approval
to board action while executives actively fulfill the directives of the board.
The legal model implies that directors have an active and intimate involvement in the affairs of the corporation.15 In closely held corporations
the characterization is fairly accurate, because considerable identity of
membership exists among the three strata of the power pyramid.' 6 With
respect to publicly held enterprises, however, the legal model falls short of
reflecting the true power structure. The board of a public corporation advises, disciplines, and responds to crisis situations but does not routinely
participate in the decision-making process.I Typically, the corporation's
executive officers establish working policy and manage daily activities.'8
In theory, the divergence from the legal model may be reconciled if executive officers are viewed as agents of the board of directors. 19 Under this
view the work of officers would be the work of the board and ratification of
executive decisions by the board theoretically would fulfill the statutory
mandate that the board itself manage corporate affairs. 20 Such a relationship requires that directors monitor officer performance. The appointment
9. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (Vernon 1980). Article 2.32 also provides that

shareholders shall have the power to remove directors from the board. See ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 36, 39 (1977).

10. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 376.
11. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.42A (Vernon 1980).
12. Id art. 2.43.
13. See notes 6 & 7 supra and note 29 infra. The statutory directive to manage provides
little guidance as to the proper function of a board in corporate life. A number of authors
have attempted to identify specific activities which would come under the legal obligations
of managerial functions. Harold Koontz has proposed the following functions: trusteeship,
or safeguarding of corporate assets; determination of enterprise objectives; selection of executives; securing long-range business stability and growth; approval of major company decisions; checking on results of these decisions; disposing of corporate profits and assets; and
approval of mergers and acquisitions. H. KOONTZ, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 24-31 (1967). See also M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
(1971).
14. The Texas Act provides that "[a]ll officers and agents of the corporation ... shall
have such authority and perform such duties in the management of the corporation as may
be provided in the bylaws, or as may be determined by resolution of the board of directors
not inconsistent with the bylaws." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.42B (Vernon 1980).
See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 50 (1977).
15. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 255 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
16. M. MACE, supra note 13, at 72-73.
17. Id at 13. Mace's conclusions were based on evidence gathered in field research of
power distribution in over 600 large, publicly held corporations. The functions listed are
those typically performed by outside directors. Id n.3.
18. Id at 184-90. See generall, M. SCHAEFTLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS (1976).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).

20. Id. § 82.
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of executive officers and other full-time corporate employees 2 1 to the board
disturbs this scheme, however, because these "inside directors" are called
upon to oversee policy and other management decisions that they are de22
termining and executing.
The board also includes outside directors, those individuals with no
working connections to the corporation. Their presence on the board prevents a merger of the executive and director strata.2 3 The outside director
should bring to the board an unbiased and objective viewpoint in order to
maximize the effectiveness of the directorial oversight function and, therefore, should be in an ideal position to evaluate management decisions
made by insiders and executives. 24 As a rule, however, outside director
involvement in corporate affairs is minimal. Outside directors are drawn
from other enterprises and professions and convene only periodically to
manage the affairs of the corporation. 25 Typically, the outside director's
decisions are made after evaluating data provided by inside directors and
executive officers. 26 Restraints on time and information limit severely the
amount of impact that outside directors can have upon corporate affairs.
In addition, most outside directors hold their positions as a result of sponsorship by insiders or executive officers; 2 7 thus, their tenure on the board
28
depends upon their compatible relationship with this group.
A number of state corporation codes accomplish a more realistic distri21. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 381. See also M. MACE, supra note 13, at 112-13.
22. Corporate officers and directors have defended the appointment of inside directors
on several grounds: executives may be most efficiently educated on the managerial process
at the board level; outside directors are afforded a unique opportunity to evaluate the performance and capabilities of executive officers when they serve together on the board; and
the attractiveness and prestige of a position on the board is an invaluable recruitment tool
for attracting talented executives into corporate service. These appointments have also been
criticized. Some corporate directors and officers recognize that an officer or employee cannot be expected to evaluate objectively the performance of his peer group, particularly of
those officers who serve on the board as well. In addition, the appointment of an executive is
perceived as a dilution of executive talent and unnecessary because the corporation already
has the benefit of that executive's expertise. M. MACE, supra note 13, at 111-27.
23. There is an increasing tendency toward the creation of boards that are composed
predominately of outside directors. Id at 111-12. See generally A. COHEN & R. LOEB,
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS

(1978).

24. It has been noted that until recently the role of the outside director did not differ
significantly from that of the inside director except as to the time committed to the endeavor.
Outsiders were appointed to provide special expertise, access to political and economic
power bases, cosmetic value, and to add an objective viewpoint in times of crisis. The modem view is that the outside director will devote more time to corporate affairs and deal at
arm's length with management. A. COHEN & R. LOEB, supra note 23, at 46-48.
25. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 378.
26. Id at 380.
27. J. BACON & J. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION
AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD 28-29 (Conference Board Rep. No. 646, 1975). The
report indicates that it is the chief executive who most commonly controls the composition
of the board by nominating members or by exercising a veto power over those who are
nominated by the board. Id
28. M. MACE, supra note 13, at 80. See J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 27, at 10.
The report notes that "if a director seems to the chief executive to be deficient, the chief
executive can ask for, and get, his resignation. It is the chief executive, moreover, who himself defines deficiency: whether it is poor attendance at meetings; failure to do homework
between meetings; or a proclivity to ask tough, potentially embarrassing questions." Id
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bution of corporate power by providing that management of a corporation
shall be by or under the direction of the board of directors. 29 The Model
Business Corporation Act includes such a provision. 30 The drafters of this
section recognized that the traditional designation of board function implies a necessity for board members' daily involvement in corporate affairs.
The present version was aimed specifically at relieving the board of this
responsibility. 3 1 In addition, state codes that provide the right of the board
to delegate authority in limited circumstances 32 address the divergence of
the working power structure from the statutory model to a more restricted
degree. Under Texas law the board may delegate authority either to executive committees composed of select members of the board, 33 or to executive officers and agents of the corporation. 34 The right to delegate had
been recognized as appropriate in case law prior to its codification 35 and
represents both a legislative and a judicial recognition that the statutory
mandate to manage cannot be construed literally. The right is limited,
however, and the Texas Act specifically refuses to relieve directors of liability for certain acts designated to the board by law. 36 In addition, the
codes of most states, including Texas, relieve directors of liability for negligent or prohibited acts performed in a good faith reliance upon advice,
provided by board committees and specified
counsel, and information
37
nonboard individuals.
The current divergence from the legal model of the corporate
power/management structure increases the difficulty of providing directors
with accurate guidelines to follow in the conduct of their offices. Faced
with a statutory mandate to manage and a de facto limitation of the position to an advisory role, directors are caught in a dilemma as to their responsibility to the corporation and its shareholders. 38 The outside director
29.

CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 300(a) (West Supp. 1981);

FLA. STAT. ANN. §

607.111(1) (West

1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
30. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1977).
31. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 255 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (Supp. 1980).
33. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.36 (Vernon 1980).
34. Id art. 2.42B.

35. San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.2d 650 (1937).
36. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.36 (Vernon 1980). Article 2.36 specifically prohibits the delegation of authority to board committees of certain board functions, including
amending the articles of incorporation, approving a plan for merger or consolidation and

recommending to the shareholders the sale, lease, or exchange of all or substantially all of
the corporation's assets.
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 157.42-10 (Smith-Hurd 1954); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.41C-.41D (Vernon 1980).
38. M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 18, at 64-65. Schaeftler notes that considerable confusion exists as to how to define the role and duties of outside directors and that this confusion
has forestalled for some time attempts by the Securities and Exchange Commission and
others to formulate precise legal guidelines. Id at 64. He continues to suggest that the final
guidelines should relate, in part, to "questions of the extent to which outside directors may
rely on corporate employees, documents, or committee findings; to the scope and nature of
the position; and to standards setting forth the responsibilities of outside directors." Id at
65.
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is often lacking in orientation to his duties, 39 yet the standard of care applicable to directors, which is promulgated under common law and now codified in a number of state corporation acts, makes no distinction between
the functions of inside and outside directors. 40 Increased concern exists
over the potential liability of individual directors for the acts of co-directors, executive officers, and other corporate employees. 4' The codification
of indemnity statutes4 2 and the increasing use of liability insurance 43 reflect this trend.
II.

COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

The personal liability of an individual director stems from the breach of
some duty that has been imposed through statute or common law. Article
2.41 of the Texas Act44 is typical of statutorily determined liabilities. The
Act provides that a director will be liable for one of the following actions:
voting for or assenting to the declaration of dividends or other distributions of assets contrary to provisions of the Act or the articles of incorporation;45 voting for or assenting to the purchase of the corporation's own
shares contrary to provisions of the Act; 46 voting for or assenting to the
distribution of assets to shareholders during liquidation proceedings without the prior payment or discharge of corporate obligations; 47 voting for or
assenting to a loan to an officer or director until the loan is repaid;4 8 assenting to the commencement of business before compliance with the statutory requirement of consideration for shares of at least $1000;49 and, in

the event of insolvency, voting for or assenting to any payments made out
39. Id at 64.
40. Professor Eisenberg notes that "[s]tandards of care, by the same token, often seem to
be pitched to the outside director rather than the executive, as if the former were really
running the business." Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 384. This situation is a natural consequence of the statutory mandate that directors shall manage corporate affairs. See notes 6, 7
supra.
41. See M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 18.
42. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See also W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS 587 (3d ed. 1978).
43. See M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 18. See also W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 619.
44. TEX.Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41A (Vernon 1980); see CAL. CORP. CODE § 309
(West 1977); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719 (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981). See also ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 48 (1977). The Model Act
is narrower in scope than the Texas provision and provides for liability for any director who:
(1)votes for or assents to the declaration of dividends or distribution of assets to shareholders contrary to the provisions of the Act or to restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation; (2) votes for or assents to the purchase of the corporation's own shares contrary to the
provisions of the Act; (3) or votes for or assents to any distribution of assets to shareholders
during liquidation proceedings without prior discharge of corporate debts and obligations.
Unlike the Texas statute, the Model Act affords protection from liability to any director who
has complied with a general standard of care provided in the Act. See ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 35, 48 (1977).
45. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41A(1) (Vernon 1980).
46. Id art. 2.41A(2).
47. Id art. 2.41A(3).
48. Id art. 2.41A(4).
49. Id art. 2.41A(5).
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of the reduction surplus of the corporation until the satisfaction of all creditor claims. 5 0 The Act imposes joint and several liability regardless of issues of causation or damages, 5' with mandatory contribution and
52
indemnity from other directors, or in some instances, from shareholders.
In addition to liability for breach of a statutory duty, a director may
incure liability for breach of a common law duty arising from his legal
relationship to the corporation. Whether operating under the traditional
mandate to manage corporate affairs or under the more relaxed dictate to
oversee and advise, the director exercises a high degree of discretion to
shape the affairs of the corporation and consequently is held to a high
standard of care and accountability for his actions. 3 A few state codes
have designated directors as fiduciaries of corporate interests 54 and, in one
case, of shareholder interests. 55 Most states, including Texas, do not specifically confer this status on the director by statute, but have fully developed the fiduciary relationship in case law. 56 Three broad duties stem
50. Id art. 2.41A(6).
51. Liability is conferred on any director who votes for or assents to the prohibited
actions unless that director can avail himself of one of the two reliance defenses provided in
article 2.41. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.41C, .41D (Vernon 1980). See notes 124-26
infra and accompanying text. See also Burton Mill & Cabinet Works, Inc. v. Truemper, 422
S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ refd n.r.e.), in which the court imposed a
common law liability in excess of the liability imposed by statute for violation of art.
2.41A(2). A director who is present at a meeting is presumed to have assented to the action
unless his dissent is entered in the minutes of the meeting or he files a written dissent before
or immediately after adjournment of the meeting. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41B
(Vernon 1980). See generally Hartmann & Wilson, Payment ForRepurchasedShares Under
the Texas Business CorporationAct, 26 Sw. L.J. 725 (1972); Israels, Limitationson the Corporate Purchaseof lts Own Shares, 22 Sw. L.J. 755 (1968); Murray, Legaland FinancialAspects
of Dividend Policy, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 7, 13 (1971).
52. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.41E-.41F (Vernon 1980).
53. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen the United
States Supreme Court noted that "[d]irectors ... occupy positions of a fiduciary nature, and
nothing in the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from imposing on them the strictest
measure of responsibility, liability and accountability, either as a condition of assuming office or as a consequence of holding it." Id at 549. See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939).
54. OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34(b) (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon
Supp. 1980-1981).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1975).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Perlman v. Feldman,
219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Iowa,
S. Utils. Co. v. United States, 348 F.2d 492 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Johnston v. Livingston Nursing
Home, Inc., 211 So. 2d 151 (Ala. 1968); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460
P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939);
612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927); Parsons Mobile Prods.,
Dixmoor Golf Club, Inc. v. Evans, 325 Ill.
Inc. v. Remmert, 531 P.2d 428 (Kan. 1975); Clark-Lami, Inc. v. Cord, 440 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.
1969); International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963). See
generally W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838 (rev.
perm. ed. 1975). Courts commonly refer to directors as occupying positions similar to that
612, 156 N.E. 785, 787
of trustees or agents. Dixmoor Golf Club, Inc. v. Evans, 325 Ill.

(1927) (director is a trustee as to corporation); Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 290-93, 67
S.W. 92, 94-95 (1902) (director is trustee); Dollar v. Lockney Supply Co., 164 S.W. 1076,
1079 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1914, no writ) (director is trustee as to corporation and
shareholders and agent as to creditors or other third parties). Texas and other jurisdictions,
however, have recognized that directors are not trustees or agents in a strict sense. Briggs v.
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from the fiduciary status: obedience, loyalty, and due care. 57 Unlike statutory liability, a breach of fiduciary duty and the consequent imposition of
personal liability requires a demonstration of causation and of damages.5 8
Duty of Obedience. The duty of obedience contemplates the avoidance of
ultra vires 59 acts. The director who exceeds the scope of his authority to
the detriment of corporate interests acts at his own peril.60 Traditionally, a
lack of good faith or negligence must be demonstrated to render a director
liable under the ultra vires doctrine. 6 1 In Texas the performance of an
ultra vires act, whether negligent or not, is insufficient to impose personal
liability. 6 2 While an ultra vires act may be voidable, personal liability will
attach only if the challenged action is also illegal. 63 In this regard, an illegal act is one in violation of an express statute, or one that is malum in se
or against public policy. 64 The requirement of illegality decidedly limits a
director's liability, as negligence or even willful disobedience to the limitations of office will simply result in the enjoining of the offending director's
actions in most instances.
Duty of Loyalty. The duty of loyalty requires that a director must act in
good faith and that the interests of the corporation must prevail over the
personal interests of the director. 6 5 A director runs the risk of being labeled "interested," and consequently subject to scrutiny under the duty of
loyalty guidelines, if the potential exists for his personal interests, or the
interests of an enterprise with which he is associated, to influence his behavior to the detriment of his corporation. Conferral of interested director
Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891); Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 577, 218 S.W.2d
428, 431 (1949). Recognizing that the duties and obligations of directors may vary from
those of trustees or agents, some courts have designated directors as "quasi-trustees" of corporate interests. Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136
(1966); Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N.C. 127, 141 S.E. 489, 490 (1928).
57. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 10-11. See also 20 R. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 712-18 (Texas Practice 1973).
58. A plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that a director breached his fiduciary duty
and that this breach caused harm to corporate interests. In addition, the damages must be
ascertainable. See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
59. Ultra vires is defined as "[aicts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation, as
defined by its charter or laws of state of incorporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365
(5th ed. 1979). See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 38 (5th unabr. ed. 1980).
60. Directors must act within the powers conferred by state codes, the articles of incorporation, and the corporate bylaws. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 11.
61. Holmes v. Crane, 191 A.D. 820, 182 N.Y.S. 270, 274 (1920) (negligent disobedience); Leppaluoto v. Eggleston, 57 Wash. 2d 393, 357 P.2d 725, 731 (1960) (willful performance of unauthorized act). See generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 56, § 1021.
62. Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994 (1922); Sutton v. Reagan & Gee,
405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ refd n.r.e.).
63. Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994 (1922).
64. Id Such "illegal" acts should not be considered to be within the sound discretion of
a director and, therefore, should not be evaluated under the business judgment rule. See
note 137 infra and accompanying text. A number of jurisdictions, however, have applied the
rule to acts that allegedly were in violation of public policy or federal law. See notes 150-51
infra.
65. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1599 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Guidebook].
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status is a question of fact, 66 but as a general rule, the risk of this designation is present when the director makes a personal profit from a transac67
tion by dealing with the corporation or usurping a corporate opportunity,
purchases or sells assets of the corporation, 68 uses corporate assets for his
own benefit, 69 transacts business in his official capacity with a second enterprise with which he is also associated as a director or by some significant
financial basis, 70 or transacts business in his official capacity with a member of his family. 7 1 In addition, the compensation that a director receives
for his services to the corporation may raise questions of72reasonableness if
it is so high as to suggest a wasting of corporate assets.
Under early common law, any transactions involving an interested director were voidable at the insistence of corporate representatives or shareholders. 73 The modem view, however, is that while such transactions are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny, they are voidable only if the challenged
action is found to be unfair to the corporation.7 4 In any instance, findings
66. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963). See
generally Comment, The InterestedDirector in Texas, 21 Sw. L.J. 794 (1967).

67. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963). See
also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(1939); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918). In
many states the corporation code contains provisions that govern the transactions between a
director and his corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS §

450.1545 (West 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Page 1978). See also ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41 (1977). The Texas Act does not include a conflict of interest
provision.
68. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Numismatic Co., 380 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Zorn, 24 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1929, writ dism'd); Allen v. Hutcheson, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 121 S.W. 1141 (1909, writ
ref'd).
69. Scott v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 97 Tex. 31, 75 S.W. 7 (1903); Duncan v.
Ponton, 102 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, no writ).
70. Reynolds-Southwestern Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 438 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121
N.E. 378 (1918).
71. Davis v. Nueces Valley Irrigation Co., 103 Tex. 243, 126 S.W. 4 (1910).
72. Todd v. Southland Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
845 (1956); Nelms v. A & A Liquor Stores, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); A.J. Anderson Co. v. Kinsolving, 262 S.W. 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1924, writ dism'd).
73. Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651 (1880); see Marsh,.Are DirectorsTrustees?
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966). Several early Texas
cases adopted this view. Texas Auto Co. v. Arbetter, 1 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1927, writ dism'd); Canadian Country Club v. Johnson, 176 S.W. 835 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1915, writ ref'd).
74. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939), the United States Supreme Court
noted that directors' "dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and
where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is
on the director. . . not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its
inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein." See
also International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963); Henger v.
Sale, 365 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1963); Popperman v. Rest Haven Cemetery, Inc., 162 Tex. 255,
345 S.W.2d 715 (1961); Western Inn Corp. v. Heyl, 452 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wiberg v. Gulf Coast Land & Dev. Co., 360 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). State codes that govern director conflict of
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of fraud, over-reaching or waste of corporate assets will confer liability
upon the offending director and will result in the voiding of the transaction.75 Otherwise, a director must carry the burden of proving that the
challenged action is fair to the corporation. 76 If a particular transaction
fails under the fairness test, Texas courts still may uphold it if it is ratified
77
by a majority of disinterested directors or by a majority of shareholders.
In Texas the interested78director who also is a shareholder may vote to ratify his challenged act.
Texas breach of loyalty cases indicate that a director may profit personally from an interested transaction, but only if the profit is incidental to his
promotion of corporate interests. In InternationalBankers Life Insurance
Co. v. Holloway 79 the Texas Supreme Court noted that a director's acceptance of a commission for the sale of corporate stock was "incompatible
'80
with the duty of good faith owed to the plaintiffs by the directors."
Under the Internationalholding, a breach of fiduciary duty may occur in
the absence of intent to usurp a corporate opportunity because the director
in this instance received commissions that the board previously had authorized. 8 ' The good faith requirement, which the holding in International
demands, appears to require that a director act with an intent to confer
benefit on the
corporation and not simply with an intent not to injure the
82
corporation.
Duty of Care. The duty of care requires a director to be diligent and prudent in his management of corporate affairs. The terminology commonly
used when discussing the duty resembles the ordinary negligence standard
and suggests a demand for reasonableness in the conduct of an individual
as director.8 3 Judicial references to the duty appear consistently in Texas
and other jurisdictions, and state codes, as well as the Model Act,8 4 have
interest provide guidelines for evaluating whether a transaction should be upheld. See note
67 supra. See also ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41 (1977).
75. Allen v. Wilkerson, 396 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref d n.r.e.);

Mercury Life & Health Co. v. Hughes, 271 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954,
writ ref d); Duncan v. Ponton, 102 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, no writ);
Allen v. Hutcheson, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 121 S.W. 1141 (1909, writ refd).
76. Popperman v. Rest Haven Cemetery, Inc., 162 Tex. 255, 345 S.W.2d 715 (1961).
77. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963);
Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 67 S.W. 92 (1902); Wiberg v. Gulf Coast Land & Dev. Co.,
360 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.). In Milam v. Cooper
Co., 258 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953, writ ref d n.r.e.), the court noted that
shareholders may ratify a transaction founded in fraud or overreaching by unanimous vote
in the absence of injury to creditors.
78. Wiberg v. Gulf Coast Land & Dev. Co., 360 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ refd n.r.e.).
79. 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
80. Id at 578.
81. Id at 575.
82. Id at 578.
83. Courts commonly evaluate allegations of negligent mismanagement by asking the
question as to whether the challenged action had a sound business rationale. This is a shorthand manner of applying the business judgment rule.
84. The scope of the duty of due care, as designated in case law and by statute, is discussed in notes 88-115 infra and accompanying text.
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incorporated negligence standards. Parameters of the duty of care, however, are difficult to define, and as a result, the standard of care applicable
to director conduct is susceptible of varying interpretations.
In summary, the fiduciary status of a director demands that he be obedient, loyal, and diligent while handling the interests of his corporation.
Theoretically, a breach of any one of these duties, causing damage to the
corporation, should confer personal liability on the offending director and
on those other directors who aided or assented to his action. Case law,
however, indicates a significant divergence from the legal standards that
these duties dictate and presents a dichotomy between standards that arise
from the fiduciary status of directors and those that the courts use. 85 The
divergence may reflect the unsatisfactory position of the director as manager under law but advisor and overseer in fact, 86 and may represent a
judicial reluctance to enforce a legal scheme that inaccurately describes a
director's function in the modern, publicly held corporation. This Comment proposes that the courts use the business judgment rule as a tool to
avoid applying the standards of conduct that naturally flow from the
fiduciary relationship.
III.

STANDARDS OF CONDUCT APPLICABLE TO CORPORATE DIRECTORS

The standards of conduct that are applicable to directors result from a
synthesizing of the legal responsibilities arising from the duties of loyalty
and due care. The duty of loyalty demands that a director act in the best
interest of the corporation and be motivated by an intent to benefit and
further corporate interests. 87 The requirement that stems from the duty of
due care is less susceptible of precise definition. Courts unanimously require a director to act in good faith, indicating that he must be honest and
believe that his decisions will benefit the corporation. 88 As such, the good
faith requirement is a mandate to avoid actions that are reckless, willful or
grossly negligent.8 9 The degree of care required under this duty is more
difficult to define. The law of the nineteenth century established that directors are bound to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence in the conduct of corporate affairs. 90 The often quoted holding in Hun v. Carey,9 1
represents the general standard: "One who voluntarily takes the position
of director and invites confidence in that relation, undertakes . . . that he
possesses at least ordinary knowledge and skill, and that he will bring
85. See note 149 infra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 65-82 supra and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979). Good faith is an element of the statutory standards of care provided in a variety of
state corporation acts. See notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text. See also ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 35 (1977).
89. See Guidebook, supra note 65, at 1599-1601.
90. For a discussion of early cases dealing with the director standard of care, see 55
L.R.A. 751 (1902).
91. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
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these to bear in the discharge of his duties."'92
In Hun the board of directors of a bank incurred debts for development
of capital assets that were far in excess of those that its financial base warranted. After the bank failed, the trustee in bankruptcy charged the directors with negligence in the investment of funds. The bank directors
defended their actions by claiming that the overreaching resulted from "errors of judgment." 93 In affirming a finding of liability for negligent mismanagement the New York Court of Appeals discussed at length the
rationale for applying a standard of ordinary skill and care to director conduct. 94 The court recognized that too high a standard of care would discourage even the most competent and diligent of individuals from
accepting the risks normally associated with any business enterprise. 95
Conversely, too low a standard would fail to protect investors from mismanagement of their assets and consequently would discourage entry into
investment markets. 96 For these reasons, the court found that something
more demanding than a gross negligence standard must serve as a basis for
determining director liability. 97 While other early cases appeared to require willful or reckless conduct or fraud to render a director liable,98 the
Hun court interpreted many of these cases as in fact utilizing a criterion of
ordinary negligence. 99
Difficulties arise, however, when an attempt is made to define with
greater precision a standard of care that is applicable to directors, because
any standard must be flexible enough to accommodate a variety of business transactions.l °° Most states require ordinary care in the conduct of
92. Id at 74.
93. Id at 67. A finding that the challenged action resulted from an error or mistake in
business judgment triggers the application of the business judgment rule and, consequently,
the exoneration of the defendant from liability for negligent mismanagement. Judicial distinctions between mistakes in business judgment and breaches in fiduciary duty are discussed at notes 141-45 infra and accompanying text.
94. 82 N.Y. at 70-74.
95. Id

at 70-7 1. The Hun court's concern that too high a standard of care would dis-

courage able individuals from accepting board positions has been a significant factor in the
development of the business judgment rule. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct.
1944), inwhich a New York court noted that "to encourage freedom of action on the part of
directors, or to discourage interference with the exercise of their free and independent judgment, there has grown up what is known as the business judgment rule."
96. Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880).
97. Id at 73-74.
98. See cases cited in 55 L.R.A. 751, 754-55 (1902). The most notable among these is
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
[W]hile directors are personally responsible to the stockholders for any losses
resulting from fraud, embezzlement or wilful misconduct or breach of trust for
their own benefit and not for the benefit of the stockholders, for gross inattention and negligence by which such fraud or misconduct has been perpetrated
by agents, officers or co-directors, yet they are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and provided they are fairly within the scope of
the powers and discretion confided to the managing body.
Id at 24.
99. Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65, 72 (1880).
100. Id. at 71; see ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 257 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
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directors, but the judicial evaluation of the requisite attention to duty may
vary from state to state. Two variant approaches exist. One line of cases
has held that the care a director exercises should be that which a prudent
man would give to his personal affairs. 10 This standard, however, has
been criticized as requiring, under a literal construction, an unrealistic degree of attention to what is a part-time endeavor. 0 2 The trend is toward
adopting a more flexible standard under which the requisite degree of care
is that which a prudent man in a like position under similar circumstances
would give. 103 The flexibility of this standard accommodates the various
levels of director involvement in management. By depending on custom
and usage, the standard protects the outside director from the expectation
that he will give his undivided attention to corporate interests.'0 4
The question of what degree of skill and knowledge the standard of care
requires also has caused confusion. The Hun decision implied that a skill
equal to the task was essential.10 5 The court reasoned that those who voluntarily choose to be directors and who are remunerated for their efforts
must be competent to perform. 10 6 This view, which a number of jurisdictions have adopted, 0 7 suggests that the standard of care properly refers to
a prudent businessman rather than merely a prudent man. Most courts
and state codes, however, do not require any special skills.' 0 8 In cases of
extreme incompetence, liability may attach on the assumption that accepting the responsibilities of a seat on the board was negligent. 0 9 For the
most part, though, the law readily forgives lack of skill in performance of
the office. 0 Contrary to scattered case law and statutes that require skill
and knowledge, the incompetent but well-meaning director ordinarily will
be immune from liability for losses that are incurred through his improvidence. Application of the standard of care raises a question as to whether
the standard incorporates prudence except under the most extreme circumstances.
In 1974 the Model Act was amended to provide the following standard:
101. See, e.g., Besselieu v. Brown, 177 N.C. 65, 97 S.E. 743 (1919); Seale v. Baker, 70
Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888).
102. Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
103. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
104. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); see ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr
ANN. 257 (2d ed. Supp. 1977), in which drafters of the Model Act's standard of care noted
that the '"phrase 'under similar circumstances' is intended. . . to recognize that the nature
and extent of oversight will vary, depending upon such factors as the size, complexity and
location of activities carried on by the particular corporation .
105. Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880).
106. Id
107. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981). See also Litwin
v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
108. Drafters of the Model Act noted that skill never has been considered a qualification
for a position on the board. As a result, they specifically avoided incorporating this requirement into the Act's standard of care because of the paucity of judicial authority as to what
skill is expected of a board member. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 256 (2d ed.
Supp. 1977).
109. Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and CorporateDirectors' Liability For Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157, 170 (1970).
110. Id
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in good faith, in a

manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would use under similar circumstances." ' The standard, which reflects
the common law, was added in response to a number of states' codification
of similar standards," 12 in the hope of promoting a uniform guide to director liability. 113 The provision includes a right to rely on information, opinions, reports, and statements from board committees, officers and other
corporate employees, attorneys, accountants, and other experts whom the
director reasonably believes to be reliable."14 This general standard of
care governs the reliance defense. By providing such a defense, avoiding
an explicit reference to skill and diligence as requisite to due care, and
incorporating the similar circumstances alternative, the drafters of the provision hoped to provide a flexible guide to director conduct that would
accommodate both the inside and outside director and would stress practical wisdom and common sense as attributes of the office."
The leading Texas case dealing with the director's standard of care is
McCollum v. Dollar,"16 in which a creditor sued corporate directors for
conversion of goods, subsequent misappropriation of funds, and negligence in the management of the corporation for failure to prevent the misappropriation of funds. The last cause of action directly raised the
question of due care. The commission of appeals held that a director must
discharge his duties with such care as "an ordinarily prudent man would
use under similar circumstances."" 7 The court presented this standard
without reference to an earlier decision, Seale v. Baker,1 8 in which the
Texas Supreme Court cited with approval a "personal affairs" variant." 9
The McCollum court noted that the question of director negligence is
largely relative and must be decided on a case-by-case basis as a question
of fact.' 20 Thus, the apparent differences in the standards that the courts
21
advanced in McCollum and Seale are likely to be largely semantic.'
111. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1977).
112. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 309(a) (West 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,

§ 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
113. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 254 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).

114. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1977). By broadening the range of situations in which directors will have the right to rely and the range of materials upon which
they can rely, this provision is responsive to the increasing complexity of corporate management responsibilities. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 254 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
115. Id. at 253-57.
116. 213 S.W. 259 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, holding approved).
117. Id at 261.
118. 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888).
119. Id. at 291, 7 S.W. at 745.
120. 213 S.W. at 261.
121. Dyson, The Director's Liabilityfor Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 371 (1965). But see
Handler & Christy, Texas CorporateDirectors' Standardof Care and Right to Rely: 4 ProposedModjcation, 8 TEx. TECH L. REV. 291, 307 (1976), in which the authors note that "a
...jury's misimpression that the 'personal affairs' variant requires a director to devote all
or substantially all his time to the corporation may tend to facilitate a finding that an outside
director has failed to satisfy the standard." The Seale decision, however, revolved accusations against bank directors, and some courts have held that bankers should be held to a
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Few Texas cases since McCollum have attempted to define a director
standard of care. While it is common for Texas courts to admit that directors will be held liable for negligent mismanagement of their corporations,
most courts simply refer to directors as fiduciaries,1 22 implying an expectation of a high degree of care. The courts note that the director, as fiduciary, is obliged to exercise an unbiased or uncorrupt business judgment in
pursuit of corporate interests.1 23 The modern view definitely stresses the
duty of loyalty, and avoids specific discussion of the parameters of due
care.
Texas has incorporated a standard of care into statutory provisions that
impose liability upon directors in certain circumstances. 124 The standard
allows a director to escape liability for violation of statutory or common
law duties if he relied on financial information or legal advice of officers,
accountants, or attorneys.1 25 The standard reflects the due care and good
faith requirements that have developed in case law. 126 Since the adoption
of this approach in 1955, however, no litigation has defined the scope of
the ordinary care defense.
The negligent director should be held liable to his corporation only for
damages that his mismanagement causes. Only corporate representatives
or shareholders, through the device of a derivative suit,' 27 may pursue a

legal remedy for these damages. Although early Texas cases indicated that
third party claimants may sustain an action against directors for negligent
management of corporate affairs, 128 the better view is that such plaintiffs
lack the requisite standing to sue for damages accruing to corporate interstandard of care higher than that of directors of other corporations. Cosmopolitan Trust Co.
v. Mitchell, 242 Mass. 95, 136 N.E. 403 (1922); Greenfield Say. Bank v. Abercrombie, 211
Mass. 252, 97 N.E. 897 (1912); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
122. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 576 (Tex. 1963);
Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 290-91, 67 S.W. 92, 93-94 (1902); Dowdle v. Texas Am. Oil
Corp., 503 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ); Fagan v. La Gloria Oil
& Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
123. In re Westec Corp., 434 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1970); International Bankers Life
Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963).
124. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41C (Vernon 1980).

125. Id art. 2.41D. Article 2.41C applies specifically to violations of art. 2.41A(l)-(3).
See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. Article 2.41D has an application unrestricted
to any specific statutory liability and provides:
A director shall not be liable for any claims or damages that may result from
his acts in the discharge of any duty imposed or power conferred upon him by
the corporation if, in the exercise of ordinary care, he acted in good faith and
in reliance upon the written opinion of an attorney for the corporation.
126. McCollam v. Dollar, 213 S.W. 259 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, holding approved).
See Handler & Christy, supra note 121. The authors advocate the adoption of a modified
version of the revised Model Act § 35 into the Texas Act to establish a "substantially uniform and flexible 'similar circumstances' standard of care for Texas corporation directors
and also to avoid any confusion engendered by the existing case law." Id at 321. In addition, the authors suggest that the Texas Act should include a broader right-to-rely provision
so that the Act may be more responsive to modern corporate needs. Id
127. See notes 163-67 infra and accompanying text.
128. Scale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888); McCollum v. Dollar, 213 S.W. 259
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, holding approved).
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ests. 129 This view has been justified on two grounds. First, the right to
recover is a corporate asset that properly is vindicated only by corporate
30 Secondly,
representatives because the legal harm is to the corporation.
the duty of loyalty is paramount to any care that a director might owe to
third party claimants. 13' Under the latter view, a director's action that
in liability if the best interests
causes harm to a third party will not result
32
of the corporation motivated the action.'
Texas law has established two exceptions to the rule that grants immunity from third party suits. A director may be held liable for tortious conduct if he participated in the wrong or had actual or constructive
knowledge of the wrong. '33 In such instances, a corporation itself is liable
in tort and the participating director is regarded as a joint tortfeasor. The
second exception involves what has been designated the trust fund doctrine, whereby directors will be held liable to creditors who failed to receive an equitable share of corporate assets after insolvency of a
corporation. I34 Under this theory, directors and officers of the insolvent
corporation are viewed as trustees of corporate assets for the benefit of
creditors and, therefore, become fiduciaries of creditor interests. This status will impose a liability for breach of fiduciary duty similar to that liability accruing from the director's relationship to a corporation or to its
shareholders.
IV.

THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: A SHIELD
LACK OF DUE CARE

To

ACCUSATIONS OF

In Hun v. Carey' 35 the New York Court of Appeals noted that directors
who "act in good faith within the limits of power conferred, using proper
prudence and diligence

. . .

are not responsible for mere mistakes or er-

36

The court was articulating what would come to be
rors of judgment."'
known as the business judgment rule. The rule may apply when the dis129. 7 W. DORSANEO & P.

WINSHIP, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE §

160.09 (1980).

130. Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ
refd n.r.e.).

131. Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974).
132. Id at 726. See also Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App-San
Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Sutton court also noted that recovery by an individual
creditor would not bar recovery by the corporation for negligence of a director and consequently, to permit creditors to recover would expose directors to a double liability. Id at
835.
133. McCollum v. Dollar, 213 S.W. 259 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, holding approved)
(co-mingling of funds); Permian Petroleum Co. v. Barrow, 484 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1972, no writ) (misappropriation of funds owing to a third party); Penroc Oil
Corp. v. Donahue, 476 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (misrepresentation); Bower v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1929, writ
ref'd) (conversion of corporate stock).

134. Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 143, 24 S.W. 16

(1893); Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd, n.r.e.);
Fagan v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973, no writ). See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
135. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
136. Id at 70.
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cretionary, as opposed to the ministerial, actions of directors are challenged.' 37 It represents a judicial reluctance to exercise hindsight in
evaluating the wisdom of business ventures that have gone sour.1 38 In addition, courts have perceived the rule as a device to encourage initiative in
enterprise decisions by providing protection for imaginative
and innova139
tive directors from allegations of mismanagement.
The Hun court rule articulates the simple notion that if a director pays
heed to his fiduciary duties of loyalty, obedience, and due care he will not
be held liable by virtue of his position on the board. As such, application
of the rule is tantamount to a qualitative assessment of a director's attention to his fiduciary duty.' 40 Examination of case law, however, leads to
the conclusion that the true function of the business judgment rule has
been to shield directors from application of an ordinary care standard of
conduct. Consequently, the use of the business judgment rule has weakened the negligence standard that is relevant to mismanagement issues. As
a result, the standard of care that case law and statute describe may have
little practical relevance to American corporate law.
When addressing questions of director misconduct the courts have distinguished acts of nonfeasance and malfeasance from discretionary actions
which they have designated as business judgments.' 4' Courts traditionally
have expressed a willingness to hold a director liable for the consequences
of his failure to act.' 4 2 Nonfeasance includes those situations in which
directors essentially have abdicated their directorships by failing to attend
to significant responsibilities of their positions. 43 The business judgment
rule is not applicable to these situations because courts do not perceive
inaction as within the realm of permissible discretion. 44 In contrast, when
the action (as distinguished from the inaction) of a board member is challenged, courts have been willing to attach liability only upon proof of mal137. The fulfillment of ministerial duties allows no opportunity for the exercise of discretion. W. FLETCHER, supra note 56, § 1039. These acts are dictated by statute, by articles of
incorporation, and by corporate bylaws.
138. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
139. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
140. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
141. Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct.),
ajf'd, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976).
142. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1924); Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 A. 621 (1901); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625
(Sup. Ct. 1944).
143. Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938); Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1928); Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 417 F. Supp. 738
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010 (W.D. Ark.
1907); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975); Neese v.
Brown, 405 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1964).
144. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944). In Casey the court noted that
directors must have a wide latitude in the management of corporate affairs but observed that
"(a] director cannot close his eyes to what is going on about him in the conduct of the
business of the corporation and have it said that he is exercising business judgment." Id at
643. See also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162 N.J. Super. 355, 392 A.2d 1233 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1978) (figurehead directors will not be tolerated).
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feasance, that is, if the director's actions have been founded in fraud,
recklessness, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.14 5 Courts have resolved
allegations of misfeasance, without more, by designating the challenged
activity as a mistake of business judgment. Most often this results in the
exoneration of the director-defendant under the business judgment rule.
In such cases, the director
merely must have acted in good faith and with46
out a corrupt motive.
The business judgment rule has been viewed as a defense to allegations
of negligent mismanagement, 47 or as a rule of judicial restraint 48 by
which courts avoid involvement in the assessment of complex business affairs. Neither view, however, accurately addresses the true impact of the
rule. In reality the application of the business judgment rule has excised
the requirement that directors exercise ordinary care in the conduct of
their offices. Despite an avowed adherence to a standard of conduct that
embraces an obligation to act with due care, courts in fact have enforced a
standard that requires only good faith and attention to the duty of loyalty.' 49 Courts have extended the judicial shielding from liability for negligence to acts that are in violation of an express statute 50 or contrary to
public policy.15'
145. See, e.g., Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) (bad faith, corrupt motive); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552
F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977) (bad faith, gross abuse of discretion);
Newman v. Forward Lands, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D Pa. 1977) (fraud; but negligence,
recklessness insufficient to confer liability); Mortgage Brokerage Co. v. Mills, 100 Colo. 267,
67 P.2d 68 (1937) (bad faith); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349 (Del. Ch. 1972)
(fraud, self-dealing, gross negligence, waste of corporate assets); Kaplan v. Centex Corp.,
284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971) (gross abuse of discretion, bad faith); Puma v. Marriott, 283
A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971) (fraud, bad faith); Papalexiou v. Tower West Condominium, 401
A.2d 280 (N.J. 1979) (fraud, self-dealing, unconscionable conduct).
146. See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (honesty and fair dealing required); Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 13 Wash. App. 489,
535 P.2d 137 (1975) (good faith).
147. Comment, The Business Judgment Rule.- A Guide to CorporateDirectors'Liability, 7
ST. Louis U.L.J. 151 (1962).
148. Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guidefor Judicial
Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1967).
149. Courts often recognize due care standards and then proceed to apply less demanding standards to the facts of the case. This inconsistency is illustrated in Graham v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). Plaintiff, in a derivative suit, charged directors with mismanagement for failing to discover the antitrust violations of certain managerial employees. The court noted in a dictum that "directors of a corporation in managing
the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and
prudent men would use in similar circumstances." Id. at 130. In commenting on the potential liability of directors who fail to supervise management activities, the court noted that if a
director "has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has
refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast
the burden of liability upon him." Id The standard of care described in the former passage
and the one in fact applied to the claim of mismanagement cannot be reconciled. See Cary
& Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model
Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972), in which Professor Cary complained that
the "standard of duty of care ... is indeed at a low level." Id
150. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
151. Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970).

1981]

COMMENTS

This view is apparent in the holding of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 152 Lanza involved allegations of violations
of federal securities law' 53 and did not raise the issue of application of the
business judgment rule.' 5 4 The holding is significant under the common
law, however, because it addresses the extent of a director's obligations to
supervise corporate affairs.' 5 5 In Lanza the plaintiffs alleged that misrepresentations in stock registration statements induced them to exchange
their shares for shares in another corporation that subsequently became
insolvent. In exonerating one of the outside directors, the court held that a
director owes no duty to scrutinize all materials conveyed to prospective
purchasers. 56 In order to hold a director liable, the court stated, a plaintiff
must show that the director either had knowledge of the misrepresentation 1 57 or that his failure to discover the misrepresentation amounted to a
"willful, deliberate, or reckless disregard for the truth that is the equivalent
of knowledge."' 58 The Lanza decision established that: a director is not
an insurer of the honesty of executive officers; 159 a director is not under a
duty to investigate a transaction in which he did not personally participate;' 60 and a person in control will not be held liable when he did not
exercise the control to bring about the fraudulent conduct of other corporate directors and employees. 16 ' The holding is based on an interpretation
the
of federal securities law, but the narrow view of a director's role 16that
2
opinion expresses parallels that which the common law adopted.
152. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
153. Plaintiff alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), which makes it unlawful to
employ manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the sale or purchase of securities.
154. The violation of a law should not be considered to be within the realm of permissible discretion. Courts traditionally have refused to apply the business judgment rule when
federal laws have been violated. See, e.g., Downing v. Howard, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947) (failure to register with Securities and Exchange Commission);
Halpern v. Pennsylvania R.R., 189 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (violation of National
Labor Relations Act); Knopfler v. Bohen, 15 A.D.2d 922, 225 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1962) (antitrust
law violations). But see Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which the
court applied the business judgment rule in evaluating plaintiffs right to proceed in a derivative suit, despite allegations that directors had violated federal investment laws. See notes
170-84 infra and accompanying text.
155. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 26.
156. 479 F.2d at 1289.
157. Id at 1304. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that prior federal decisions had
recognized negligence as a standard for the imposition of liability for violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976). Id at 1304-5.
158. Id at 1305.
159. Id. at 1281.
160. Id
161. Id at 1298.
162. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). But see the
minority opinion in Lanza in which the dissenting judges stated that a director breaches a
duty owed to his corporation when he fails to inform himself of the activities of the corporation and that negligence in failing to keep informed should be sufficient to hold a director
liable for failure to supervise management decisions. 479 F.2d at 1317-20. The Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission cited with approval the minority guidelines in Lanza. Sommer, Directors and the Federal Securities Law, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,669.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

The business judgment rule has had a significant impact not only on the
standard of care applicable to director conduct but also on the availability
of courts to shareholders seeking judicial redress for legal harms to corporate interests. A shareholder, as representative of his class, may sue offending directors and corporate employees by means of a derivative
suit.' 63 Initially, the shareholder must make demand on the board of directors, or those members of the board who are disinterested and impartial, to institute action on behalf of the corporation. 164 The demand
requirement is based on the concept that directors, as managers of corporate interests, are the proper party plaintiffs to vindicate harms to corporate rights. 165 A shareholder may avoid the demand requirement if he can
demonstrate that demand would be futile, that is, if the existing board
would be antagonistic to his proposed cause 166 or if the board is not impartial and would therefore be incapable of rendering an unbiased decision on
the matter. 167 When demand is made and refused, the propriety 68of a
If
board's refusal to sue is evaluated under the business judgment rule.'
business
on
a
sound
is
based
it is determined that refusal to institute action
rationale, a shareholder is precluded from pursuing a legal remedy for his
grievance.'

69

Recent federal decisions have extended the impact of the business judgment rule on the course of a derivative suit. In Lasker v. Burks 70 shareholders of an investment company brought a derivative suit against some
of the company's directors, alleging that the directors had violated provisions of the Investment Company Act 17' and the Investment Advisors
Act.' 72 A disinterested minority of outside directors sought to terminate
the action, claiming that the prosecution would be contrary to the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 173 In opposing the directors' motion to dismiss, the plaintiff-shareholder argued that because the
challenged action allegedly violated a federal law, the decision of the
board not to prosecute could not be a matter of business judgment; that
refusal to prosecute would be tantamount to an unlawful ratification of the
challenged action; and that because a majority of the board was disqualified, the disinterested minority did not possess the requisite authority to
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.

164. Id
165. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Brody v.
Chemical Bank, 5 I F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
166. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
167. Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
168. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Ash v.
International Business Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927
(1966).
169. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amagamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
170. 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1976).
172. Id § 80b.
173. 404 F. Supp. at 1176.
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terminate the action.' 74 The district court held that because the federal
laws that were involved did not explicitly provide for a private action, the
strong federal policies underlying the acts did not bar a board from exercising its business judgment in determining whether or not to prosecute the
alleged cause.' 75 The court also noted that the question of the proper use
of business judgment was distinct from the question of ratification, 76 and
that in the past, both state and federal courts have permitted termination
77
of derivative suits involving claims that were arguably nonratifiable.
Lastly, the court found that the good faith business judgment of a genuinely disinterested minority not to pursue a cause of action was sufficient
under law and was final. 178 The district court later granted summary judgment against the plaintiff, finding that there was no evidence that the mi179
nority of the directors had not acted independently and in good faith.
The court of appeals reversed, noting that the alleged violation of a federal
80
law precluded disinterested directors from terminating a cause of action.'
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals
and remanded' 8 ' the cause for determination under a proposed two-tier
test: first, whether applicable state law permits the dismissal of a derivative action under the business judgment rule;' 82 and secondly, whether
such a dismissal is consistent with the policy underlying the Investment
Company and Advisors Act. 183 The Court did note that under the federal
statutes in question Congress did not require that state or federal courts
absolutely forbid director termination of all nonfrivolous actions.' 8 4 This
observation, therefore, indirectly ratified the district court's determination
that the courts might apply the business judgment rule to issues that involve allegations of illegal activities.' 85
Only two state courts 86 have addressed the issue of the applicability of
the business judgment rule to the dismissal of derivative actions against
174. Id at 1177.
175. Id. at 1179-80.
176. Id at 1180.

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id
Id at 1179.
426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1977).

181.

441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979).

182. Id at 480.
183. Id
184. Id

185. A similar use of the business judgment rule is noted in the earlier district court
decision in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which a shareholder

derivatively sued directors of Exxon for making what were alleged to be illegal payments to
a foreign government. The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
in the absence of a showing of fraud, collusion, self-interest, dishonesty, or other breaches of
trust, and in the absence of a demonstration that the use of business judgment was tantamount to gross negligence, the court would not interfere with the judgment of disinterested
directors to terminate a cause of action. Id at 516. The court noted that "the conclusive
effect of such a judgment cannot be affected by the allegedly illegal nature of the original
action which purportedly gives rise to the cause of action." Id at 518.
186. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47

N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
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defendant-directors. In Maldonado v. Fynn 187 the Delaware Court of
Chancery held that under Delaware law the rule could not shield the decision of disinterested directors to dismiss actions against other board members.' 88 The court noted that through a derivative action, a shareholder
seeks to compel a corporation to institute legal actions in its own behalf
and that the shareholder's right to compel action cannot be defeated under
the rule.' 89 The court conceded, however, that use of the business judgment rule is appropriate to dismissal of derivative suits against
noncorporate defendants and is available to directors defending a derivative action as a defense going to the merits of an action.' 90
In Auerbach v. Bennett,' 9 ' a decision prior to Lasker, the New York
Court of Appeals noted that under New York law the decision whether to
pursue an action rests with the corporation and, consequently, is within the
judgment and control of the board of directors.' 9 2 Unlike the Maldonado
court, the New York Court of Appeals made no distinction between actions against corporate and noncorporate defendants. The court, however,
did note that the business judgment rule should shield the "deliberations
and conclusions of the chosen representatives of the board only if they
possess a disinterested independence and do not stand in a dual relation
187. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
188. Id. at 1261-62. Maldonado was followed in Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp.
348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (construing Delaware law). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) [hereinafter referred to as Maldonado-Fed], in which a federal district
court, dealing with the same litigants and disputes as did the Delaware Court of Chancery,
held that Delaware law did permit dismissal of derivative actions against directors under the
business judgment rule. Based on the res judicata effects of Maldonado-Fed,the Delaware
Court of Chancery subsequently dismissed the action in Maldonado, but stayed the dismissal pending appeal of the federal decision. 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980). For cases in
accord with Maldonado-Fed,see Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Abramowitz v. Posner, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 97,921 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1981).
189. 413 A.2d at 1261-62.
190. Id at 1256, 1258-60. In making the distinction between corporate and noncorporate
defendants the court relied on Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A. 73, 73 (Del. Ch. 1932), in which the
chancery court recognized the right of a shareholder to pursue an action in instances in
which the corporation will not sue because it is dominated by alleged wrongdoers. The
reasoning of the Cantor court, however, appears to address the potential for a lack of good
faith in the decision to dismiss and does not bar per se the use of the rule when directors are
defendants. Abramowitz criticized Maldonado, noting that the chancery court presented no
logical basis for the distinction between corporate and noncorporate defendants, and would
"render meaningless" the demand requirement under the Delaware rules of civil procedure.
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,921, at 90,691-92.
191. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
192. 47 N.Y.2d at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927; accord, Clark v. Lomas
& Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980) (construing Texas law); Lewis v.
Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (construing California law); Grossman v. Johnson,
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,950 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 1981) (construing Maryland law); Abramowitz v. Posner, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
97,921 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1981) (construing Delaware law); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (construing Michigan law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (construing Delaware law). Contra, Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco
Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (construing Virginia law); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490
F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (construing Delaware law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251 (Del. Ch. 1980) (construing Delaware law).
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which prevents an unprejudicial exercise of judgment."' 193 Thus, the New
York court perceived the relevant issue to be the good faith and disinterwho seek dismissal and not the authority of such
estedness of the directors
194
directors to do so.
A number of federal courts, following the Lasker inquiry, have examined whether dismissal of derivative actions under the business judgment rule would contravene policies underlying federal law.' 95 Decisions
that deal with alleged violations of the proxy disclosure provisions of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are of particular significance. 196 The Supreme Court has recognized an implied private right of
action under this section in favor of shareholders who have been injured as
a result of false or misleading proxy solicitations. 97 In Abbey v. Control
Data Corp. 198 a shareholder sought damages under section 14(a), claiming
that the failure of Abbey's directors to disclose allegedly illegal foreign
payments caused him injury. In affirming' 99 the district court's dismissal
of the action under the business judgment rule, the court noted that a
plaintiff must demonstrate "'transactional causation' " as an essential element of a section 14(a) cause of action. 2°° The court held that any injury
to plaintiff-shareholder was caused by the waste of corporate assets and
not by "allegedly misleading proxy solicitations dealing with unrelated
corporate business matters."'20' Accordingly, the shareholder claim was
deemed to be only "marginally related" to the policies underlying the dis193. 47 N.Y.2d at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
194. Id The plaintiff claimed that the appointment by the defendant directors of a special committee to rule on the advisability of potential litigation was sufficient evidence that
members of the committee could not function independent of the board. 47 N.Y.2d at 632,
393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. The court, in rejecting this argument, viewed the
risk of "hesitancy" of board members to initiate litigation against members of its own peer
group "inescapable." 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. Additionally, the court noted that to accept plaintiffs argument would be to disqualify the entire
board from making the type of managerial decision traditionally entrusted to board action.
Id But see Galif v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the Second Circuit
remanded for determination as to whether, under Ohio law, defendant directors who have
ratified an allegedly illegal transaction but who have not benefited from that transaction,
were sufficiently impartial to seek dismissal.
195. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 11981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,000 (9th Cir. May 18, 1981) (§ 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980) (§ 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (§§ 13(a), 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act
of 1934), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Grossman v. Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder]
97,950 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 1981) (Investment Company Act);
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Abramowitz v. Posner, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,921 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 1981) (§ 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.
Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (§ 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1976).
197. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
198. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
199. 603 F.2d at 732.
200. Id The court noted, in addition, that a number of courts have refused to find a
federal remedy under § 14(a) for illegal foreign payments by corporations. Id See, e.g., In
re Tenneco Sec. Litigation, 449 F. Supp. 528(S.D. Tex. 1978).
201. 603 F.2d at 732.
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closure requirements of section 14(a). 20 2
20 3
In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Galefv. Alexander
concluded that a section 14(a) claim was not subject to dismissal under the
business judgment rule. 2° 4 The court reasoned that because the purpose of
section 14(a) was to prevent management from obtaining authority for corporate action by means of deceptive or misleading proxy solicitations, a
denial of a derivative right might frustrate "a type of enforcement that is
essential to the accomplishment of the goals of [this section]. ' ' 205 The
Galef dispute, however, involved dismissal by defendant-directors who
had not benefited from the challenged transaction but who had ratified it.
Whether the Second Circuit would extend this holding to situations in
which nondefendant directors seek termination of actions against other
20 6
board members, therefore, is not clear.
Despite the growing prominence of Texas as a regional corporate base,
few Texas cases have addressed questions of director standard of care, negligent mismanagement, and business judgment. Nevertheless, the clear
view of those few courts that have confronted these issues has parallelled
those of other jurisdictions. In one early case, Cates v. Sparkman,207 the
Texas Supreme Court stated the standard for judicial interference in derivative actions as follows:
[I]f the acts or things are or may be that which the majority of the
company have a right to do, or if they have been done irregularly,
negligently, or imprudently, or are within the exercise of their discretion and judgment in the development or prosecution of the enterprise
in which their interests are involved, these would not constitute such a
breach of duty, however unwise or inexpedient such acts might be, as
would authorize interference by the courts at the suit of a share20 8
holder.
Thus, despite the ordinary care standard set forth in the McCollum 209 decision, Texas courts consistently have followed the Cates requirement that
liability should attach to a director's action only if the action is ultra vires
202. Id In reaching the same conclusion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
"[s]o long as those accused of manipulating the proxy vote are excluded from deciding
whether or not to pursue the claim there is no conflict between the business judgment rule
and § 14(a)." Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, the Ninth Circuit
avoided addressing the issue of § 14(a) policies and demanded only that the decision to
dismiss be made by disinterested directors. This conclusory treatment of the second tier of
the Lasker inquiry is apparent also in the holding in Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Maldonado-Fed court did stress, however, that plaintiff was free to
pursue an independent claim, so that dismissal of the derivative action did not preclude the
litigation of claims against defendant-directors. 485 F. Supp. at 281.
203. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
204. Id at 53.
205. Id at 63. The court noted that in many instances the derivative suit may be the
only practical means available to shareholders to vindicate harms accruing from director
mismanagement. Id
206. See Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as Applied to Stockholders Proxy
Derivative Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 112 (1980).
207. 73 Tex. 619, 11 S.W. 846 (1889).
208. Id. at 622, 11 S.W. at 849.
209. McCollum v. Dollar, 213 S.W. 259 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, holding adopted).
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or is based in fraud. 2 10 Texas courts have applied this requirement not
sUits211 but also to suits that corporate representatives
only to derivative
2 12
institute.
In Texas and other jurisdictions, the majority of actions that allege negligent mismanagement are filed through the device of the derivative suit.
The application of the business judgment rule, however, forces a plaintiffshareholder to confront a two-tier barrier to legal redress. First, he must
be prepared to establish that a director's action was grossly negligent, despite the legal requirement that directors must act with ordinary care. Secondly, he must be prepared to demonstrate that allegedly disinterested
directors have in fact acted collusively or fraudulently in refusing his demand to prosecute offending directors or officers. Thus, the business judgment rule serves not only as a defense for defendant directors but also as a
presumption against the standing of plaintiff-shareholders to proceed in an
action against directors. This double requirement presents a formidable
barrier to aggrieved shareholders and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the business judgment rule may serve as an effective shield against
allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty. In effect, the rule not only modifies the standard of care that case law and statutes developed, but also
represents a judicial abdication of the court's role in determining whether
a director has violated his legal duties to the corporation and its shareholders.
V.

MODERN TRENDS: WILL DIRECTORS BE
HELD MORE ACCOUNTABLE?

The modem realities of corporate organization require that an outside
director function not to manage the corporation, but to oversee management decisions of corporate officers and employees. An evaluation of a
director's performance, therefore, should focus primarily on the degree of
effectiveness with which he monitors the decisions of the executive stratum. The business judgment rule, by negating the fiduciary requirement
for due care, has obscured the legal requirements necessary to guide the
oversight function and, accordingly, has insulated directors from liability
for the negligence of those to whom they have delegated a board function.
In sharp contrast, the growing tendency under federal securities law is to
210. See Robinson v. Bradley, 141 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1940, no writ);
Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1916, no writ); Caffall v.
Bandera Tel. Co., 136 S.W. 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Farwell v. Babcock, 65 S.W. 509
(Tex. Civ. App. 1901). See also Zauber v. Murray Say. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
211. Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth
Circuit held that the decision whether to pursue a corporate cause of action is part of the
that corporate directors primarily manage." Id at 52 (citations
"'business and affairs' ..
omitted).
212. Jewel v. Sal-O-Dent Laboratories, 69 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934,
writ refd); New Birmingham Iron & Land Co. v. Blevins, 34 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App.
1896, no writ).
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hold outside directors more accountable for management decisions. 21 3
This trend is illustrated in the decision of a federal district court in Escot v.
BarChris Construction Corp.,214 which involved allegations that registration statements for BarChris stock contained material misrepresentations
and omissions in violation of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.215
One outside director adopted the defense that, in view of his recent appointment to the board, he had reasonably relied on the opinions of executive officers regarding the accuracy of nonexpert portions of the
registration statement. 2 16 In rejecting this due diligence defense the court
stated that:
A director is presumed to know his responsibility when he becomes a
director. He can escape liability only by using that reasonable care to
investigate the facts which a prudent man would employ in the management of his own company. A prudent man would not act in an
important matter without any knowledge of the relevant facts, in sole
reliance upon representations of persons who are comparative strangers and upon general information which does not purport to cover
the particular case. To say that such minimal conduct measures up to
the statutory standard would, to all intents and purposes, absolve new
21 7
directors from responsibility merely because they are new.
Some commentators have said that BarChris added nothing to the
guidelines for evaluating director functions.2" 8 Others, however, see the
decision as reviving standards of care that the courts have discarded for
sometime. 2 9 Thq decision has caused concern on the part of outside di213. This sentiment was expressed by A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, who stated:
The elevation of standards of conduct in society is invariably accompanied by
stresses and forebodings and exaggerated fears of the consequences of reaching to higher levels of performance. It is not surprising that, as the developing
concepts of federal securities law reach out to touch corporate directors, there
should be tremors and concerns. And yet, out of all of this there will surely
come greater awareness of the importance of conscientious conduct by
corporate fiduciaries and greater attention to the responsibilities which are assumed when one becomes a director.
quoted in J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 27, at 82. See also Sommer, Directorsand the
Federal SecuritiesLaws, [1974] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

79,669.

214. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446
F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
215. Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability upon the issuer of securities and
certain designated persons when a registration statement contains an untrue statement of a
material fact or an omission of a material fact. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)(l)-(5) (1976).
216. The Act provides a "due diligence" defense as to nonexpert and expert portions of a
registration statement. In regard to nonexpert portions a defendant must establish that he
made a reasonable investigation of the facts presented and the he had reasonable grounds
for believing that the statement was accurate and complete. The standard by which reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief is evaluated is "that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976). The
standards governing expert portions of the statement are set forth in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k(b)(3)(B)-(D) (1976).
217. 283 F. Supp. at 688.
218. See Cohen, The Opinion, 24 Bus. LAW. 550 (1969).
219. Kaplan, PanelDiscussion, 24 Bus. LAW. 611 (1969); Shaneyfelt, The PersonalLiability Maze of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 58 NEB. L. REV. 692 (1979).
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rectors as to their potential liabilities under federal law.220 As a result,
many corporations have begun to reexamine the role of the outside director and have implemented measures to ensure a clearer definition of board
members' duties.22 ' Among the most notable of these measures is the institution of independent audit committees.22 2 First proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1940,22 a the audit committee is

composed primarily of independent directors who evaluate management
decisions with information that independent auditors supply. The committee is designed to maximize the effectiveness of a board's monitoring
function by providing access to unbiased information. The directive to
evaluate this information presumably would avoid the result in BarChris.
The impact that BarChris and other securities decisions will have on the
delegation function in the American corporation is not clear-cut. Corporate directors are becoming increasingly sensitive to the potential liabilities
that accrue from a broad interpretation of federal regulatory schemes and,
consequently, are more eager to have their duties clearly defined. Nevertheless, the recent applications of the business judgment rule to shareholder derivative suits represent a consistent judicial reluctance to define
the legal obligations of a corporate director. The conflict arising from
these two positions may lead to a general redefinition of directorial function, but at the moment, both directors and shareholders must suffer the
consequences of this indecision.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Under the business judgment rule a director who acts in good faith and
in the best interests of his corporation will not be held liable for mistakes
of business judgment that damage corporate interests. The rule requires
that a director act with attention to his fiduciary duties of good faith and
loyalty but avoids a requirement that he act with due care. Under the rule,
therefore, a director will be held liable only upon proof of fraud, bad faith,
or gross negligence. This result is inconsistent with common law and statutes that require directors to act with ordinary care in the conduct of their
offices and may reflect both a judicial refusal to evaluate corporate affairs
and the considerable confusion that exists as to the precise legal responsi220. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 59, at 1313.
221. See generally Guidebook, supra note 65.

222. In 1974, 80% of 1083 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange had audit
committees in operation. W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 29. Since 1978 the Stock Exchange
has required all listed companies to have audit committees. Id See also Release No. 13346,
i1 SEC DOCKET 1945 (Mar. 9, 1977).
223. In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins, Inc.-Summary of Findings and Conclusions,
Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940), cited in W. KNEPPER, supra note 42, at 29.
The recommendation was addressed to all publicly held corporations. See also Report of the
Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and
Practices, [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 353 (Special Supp. May 19, 1976). The
report, submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, proposed a
system of internal audit procedures designed to restore the "efficacy of the system of corporate accountability." [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 353, at 2.
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bilities of directors, particularly outside directors. Recent applications of
the business judgment rule to derivative actions indicate that shareholders
face an almost insurmountable barrier to establishing the liability of directors under allegations not only of negligence but also of illegal activities.
In contrast, recent developments under federal securities law indicate a
demand that outside directors be held more accountable for their official
actions. These developments have initiated attempts to define more precisely the scope of directorial function. At the moment, however, directors
continue to hold office under obscure guidelines, and shareholders face
uncertain and unsatisfactory results when they seek legal redress for harms
to corporate interests.

